


# Terrorism Index in the Arab Region

Annual Report by Maat for Peace, Development, and Human Rights for 2024





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- In 2024, terrorist threats in the Arab region continued, with ISIS remaining the most capable organization in planning and executing attacks, particularly in Syria. The group carried out operations in four Arab countries, accounting for 35.2% of all recorded terrorist incidents. ISIS targeted civilian and economic infrastructure, in a blatant violation of international humanitarian law, leading to economic instability and increased suffering among civilian populations.
- Countries experiencing armed conflicts, such as Somalia, Sudan, and Syria, remain the
  most affected by terrorist operations, with 70.4% of total incidents attributed to armed
  groups in these nations, exacerbating the humanitarian situation. Additionally, internal
  political crises and divisions in Yemen, Iraq, and Libya further contributed to the
  targeting of these areas, where 117 terrorist operations were executed, representing
  27.5% of the total recorded incidents.
- The recruitment of foreign fighters remained a key element in the strategy of some terrorist groups, with ISIS in Somalia and Libya seeking to bring in foreign combatants from Arab and Asian nationalities, violating international resolutions aimed at preventing the recruitment of foreign fighters and financing terrorism.
- Law enforcement agencies in some Arab countries suffer from a lack of necessary tools and expertise to effectively combat terrorism, hindering their ability to dismantle terrorist networks. Furthermore, the ongoing financial flows to terrorist organizations are a crucial factor in reshaping their operational capabilities, enabling them to plan new operations and recruit additional members.
- Despite ongoing challenges, counter-terrorism efforts have made significant progress in some countries, particularly Iraq, where proactive security operations have reduced the number of terrorist attacks and targeted elements responsible for developing illegal weapons within terrorist groups.
- The propaganda activities of terrorist organizations escalated in 2024, as they exploited digital technologies and electronic media to expand the reach of their ideologies. Al-Qaeda renewed its incitement propaganda, including a series of articles aimed at exploiting regional conflicts, particularly in Gaza, to mobilize new followers and incite violence.
- Coordination among transnational armed groups based on mutual interests continued, with documented cooperation between Al-Shabaab in Somalia and the Houthis in Yemen



- during 2024. This collaboration included the exchange of intelligence and operational coordination, posing a threat to civilian security and undermining regional stability.
- The use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) in terrorist operations has increased, particularly in Syria and Somalia, posing a significant threat to human security. Field reports indicate that ISIS in Syria is repurposing explosives using old stockpiles of military materials, in addition to exploiting local resources to enhance its offensive capabilities, further complicating the security landscape in the region.



# Why Terrorism Index in the Arab Region?

Maat has addressed the phenomenon of terrorism in the Arab region as a key part of its annual Arab report. However, starting in 2021, there was a recognized need for a separate terrorism index specific to the Arab region. In line with this, Maat began issuing quarterly reports on terrorism in the Arab region, along with an annual report focusing on terrorism in Arab countries. The decision to focus on the Arab region is based on several reasons:

- 1. Although Arab countries constitute only 5% of the world's population, they have been affected by over 45% of terrorist attacks before 2020.
- 2. Terrorism has proliferated in conflict areas within Arab countries, where armed groups, driven by external interventions from third countries, have used terrorism to undermine governance. The chaos created by these conflicts allows terrorism to flourish without the capacity of these states to contain or confront it effectively, thereby exacerbating its impact across all levels.
- 3. The scarcity of existing indicators and literature highlighting terrorism in the Arab region served as an additional incentive for Maat to issue this index. The aim is for this effort to serve as a reliable database and reference for scholars, researchers, think tanks studying this phenomenon, and policymakers in Arab countries.

Based on this foundation, Maat decided to release this index through comprehensive monitoring and documentation of terrorist operations in the Arab region, analyzing them against statistics verified by various methods. The goal is to identify fundamental changes in this phenomenon, dissect the factors contributing to the escalation of terrorist operations in one Arab country while diminishing in another, and finally address the main challenges obstructing effective counter-terrorism efforts. Ultimately, this aims to create a stable environment in the region, preventing further loss of civilian and military lives alike.



The report relies on a monitoring mechanism that encompasses all published reports in local and international media regarding terrorist acts that occurred in Arab countries during 2024. Information regarding these operations was also gathered from ISIS's weekly publication, Al-Naba. Maat aimed to monitor and analyze the impact of changes affecting the terrorist phenomenon, deconstructing it in a way that allows for new hypotheses and unbiased, logical conclusions about terrorism. This enables the prediction of challenges acting as obstacles to counter-terrorism efforts while ensuring a precise understanding of the phenomenon and providing a thorough diagnosis.

The report employs a systems thinking approach to better understand the dynamics of terrorism and its impact on Arab societies. It is essential to acknowledge the potential margin of error that may arise from the monitoring process. The accuracy of statistics published by local and international media may vary, sometimes differing in the number of casualties, whether injured or deceased. Therefore, it is important to note this to ensure accuracy and objectivity.



Terrorism continues to pose a fundamental shared threat among Arab countries in 2024, with even stable nations that have not faced the threat of terrorism in the past decade now at risk. The terrorist attack that resulted in the deaths of more than 55 civilians in Oman, claimed by ISIS, is a clear indication of this. According to information, the organization had planned to carry out attacks in Oman since 2017, but these plans did not materialize at that time. Maat observes that the persistence of terrorism as a threat in Arab countries is not without cause; financial resources and the organization's ability to recruit others using digital technologies, along with social grievances and the desire for revenge in some cases, are factors that fuel the continuation of terrorism in certain Arab states.

Maat documented 426 terrorist operations in 2024. These operations led to the deaths and injuries of 2,573 civilians and military personnel alike, comprising 824 military fatalities and approximately 619 civilian deaths, along with around 430 military injuries and 703 civilian injuries. Civilians accounted for 51.3% of the total casualties from terrorist operations in the Arab region. While ISIS's terrorist attacks have increased in Syria, where the organization claimed 112 operations out of 150 total attacks across four Arab countries during 2024, the threat from ISIS and its affiliated branches, as well as other armed groups in the Maghreb, has been limited due to pre-emptive strikes and counter-terrorism efforts. There were only minimal and uncoordinated attempts to carry out terrorist attacks in 2024. Moreover, terrorism has not succeeded in launching larger attacks in Iraq. However, substantial changes have occurred within the organization's structure in Somalia, including the return of the Al-Karar office as an administrative and financial center primarily serving the organization on an international level, with Somalia as its base.

It is noteworthy that the number of terrorist operations in Iraq has decreased, which is largely attributed to counter-terrorism efforts targeting ISIS militants, particularly in the Hamrin Mountains and Al-Anbar. These efforts have led to a depletion of ISIS's resources and crippled its ability to maneuver and operate in various areas. This has prompted the organization to attempt to establish local bases in the Hamrin Mountains, though these efforts remain incomplete as of the reporting period. Nonetheless, the ongoing decline of ISIS in Iraq remains contingent upon political stability within the country.

While the frequency of terrorist operations claimed by ISIS in Iraq has decreased, particularly in provinces that previously posed a threat such as Salah ad-Din and Kirkuk, there has been a continuing rise in terrorist activities in Syria, especially in the Syrian Badiya. ISIS has primarily capitalized on the frustration that has permeated the security forces and military personnel within the Syrian Army. By September 2024, ISIS relinquished several administrative



tasks, such as some paperwork, and the organization in Iraq lacked well-trained administrative and organizational structures, especially following the neutralization of several of its senior leaders. While the organization planned its operations in Syria effectively, it appears to have lacked the capacity for good planning in Iraq. According to reports, some attacks thwarted by security forces were attributed to the inefficiency of the new leadership within the organization. The regional context in the Middle East, particularly the situation in Gaza, has influenced the organization's dynamics. While ISIS distanced itself from partial engagement in these events, Al-Qaeda attempted to exploit the situation by disseminating messages from Saif al-Adl, who is believed to be the effective leader of Al-Qaeda, to garner sympathy from people in the Arab region and recruit others. It is widely anticipated that ISIS and other terrorist groups will attempt to leverage the current situation in Syria, with the Syrian Badiya remaining a hub for planning ISIS's external operations. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula has focused on developing an anti-Western media narrative following the events of October 7, 2023. This media strategy continued into 2024. Unlike ISIS, Al-Qaeda has sought to exploit the events of October 7 to promote a propaganda narrative that supports Palestinian factions.

The desire among terrorist organizations to acquire technological capabilities, such as developing drones, remains prevalent. However, restrictions on the transfer of components for these weapons have limited the capabilities of groups like Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Al-Qaeda in Yemen. It is believed that Al-Qaeda has acquired drones, which were reportedly delivered to the jihadist leader Abu Osama al-Diyani, who was close to former Al-Qaeda leader Khalid Batarfi, who passed away in March 2024.

Al-Shabaab conducted significant attacks in Somalia in 2024, primarily targeting government forces and the African Union mission, and secondarily targeting businessmen and company managers in the capital, Mogadishu. However, the rivalry between Al-Shabaab and the ISIS branch in Somalia, particularly in the Bari region, occasionally diverted the group's focus from executing terrorist attacks to countering ISIS's assaults.

It is important to note that there is no universally agreed-upon definition of terrorism; it evolves and varies depending on the country, geographical region, and the political and social context of states. As expressed by Kaliopi Kova, the rapporteur of the Subcommittee on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, in her report on terrorism submitted to the Human Rights Committee, the issue of establishing a unified definition of terrorism is a fundamental point of contention for the international community. In the absence of a consensus on what constitutes "terrorism," we have chosen to classify the terrorist operations we have monitored and documented according to the definition that closely aligns with the Arab region.



This definition is outlined in the Arab Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, which defines terrorism in Article 1, Paragraph 1 as "any act of violence or threat thereof, regardless of its motives or objectives, carried out in execution of an individual or collective criminal project, aimed at instilling terror among people or frightening them by harming them or endangering their lives or security, or causing damage to the environment or public or private facilities or property or occupying or seizing them, or endangering any national resources."

Additionally, in light of the activities of non-state actors in the Arab region, which are the primary instigators of terrorist operations, it is relevant to reference the definition of terrorism included in the Global Terrorism Database, which defines a terrorist incident as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to achieve a political, economic, religious, or social objective through intimidation or coercion."

# **Terrorism Statistics in the Arab Region**

The frequency of terrorist operations in the Arab region declined in 2024, with terrorist groups claiming responsibility for approximately 426 operations throughout the year. These operations resulted in the deaths of 1,443 individuals, including 821 military personnel and around 619 civilians, while 1,130 individuals were injured, comprising 430 military personnel and about 703 civilians.<sup>2</sup> Syria was the most affected Arab country in 2024, recording 222 terrorist operations, which led to the highest number of military fatalities among Arab nations, with 554 killed and 113 injured. Additionally, 115 civilians were killed and 122 civilians were injured.

Concerns arose regarding ISIS's potential to exploit the security vacuum resulting from the collapse of the Syrian government led by Bashar al-Assad on December 8, 2024. However, the organization only conducted two operations between December 8 and the end of 2024. It appears that the group was in the process of planning for the post-Assad era. This high number of operations in Syria can be attributed to ISIS's exploitation of the Syrian Badiya, where the majority of its operations were carried out, making it a particularly significant hub for its activities.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Defining Terrorism, Global Terrorism Database, <a href="https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/">https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/</a>

<sup>2</sup> الرصد السنوي الخاص بمؤسسة ماعت 3 أنظر، الإصدار الأسبوعي لتنظيم داعش " النبا" على الرابط التالي: https://saah.link/posts/news /






Figure (1): Classification of Arab Countries According to Terrorist Operations

# Syrian Badiya

The Syrian Badiya is a desert area covering approximately 518,000 square kilometers, accounting for nearly half of Syria's total land area. It links seven Syrian provinces: Deir ez-Zor, Hama, Raqqa, Homs, Aleppo, Rural Damascus, and Suwayda. The region extends to the Syrian-Iraqi border to the east and the Jordanian border to the south, bordering the Raqqa and Deir ez-Zor provinces. Characterized by a sparse population and rugged terrain suitable for concealment, the area features deep natural limestone caves, mountains, and valleys. Additionally, the region is known for daily dust storms that obscure aerial visibility and quickly erase traces of terrorist movements. These areas are often referred to as "dark" or "invisible" zones due to the difficulties encountered by counter-terrorism forces in monitoring them, as well as their geographical features that favor the concentration of terrorist elements.

Somalia ranked second in the terrorism index, recording 54 terrorist operations that resulted in 312 fatalities among military personnel and civilians, with approximately 253 individuals injured, including 60 military personnel and 193 civilians. Al-Shabaab, affiliated with Al-Qaeda, remained the most influential group regarding terrorism in 2024. However, the ISIS branch in Somalia appears to be planning for a long-term presence, particularly in the Bari region of



Puntland, where the organization has maintained its foothold in resource-rich areas, specifically in the Cal Miskaad mountains.<sup>4</sup>

Iraq was the third country to experience terrorist attacks in 2024, with 51 recorded operations. This figure represents a significant decline compared to 2021 to 2023, attributed to the efforts of the Counter-Terrorism Service and the intelligence cooperation between Iraq and UN member states regarding counter-terrorism.<sup>5</sup>

In Sudan, ongoing armed conflict and the lack of control over the borders with neighboring countries continue to facilitate the execution of several terrorist operations. Additionally, the Sudanese army has thwarted numerous planned attacks. Terrorist groups were responsible for 24 operations in Sudan during 2024, resulting in the highest number of civilian casualties in the Arab region due to terrorism that year, as illustrated in the figure below.




Figure (2): Civilian Victims in Sudan

Lebanon, Jordan, Algeria, Oman, Morocco, and Tunisia recorded the lowest rates of terrorist operations and human losses, with only three operations reported in Lebanon and two in Jordan. There was just one operation in each of Tunisia, Morocco, Algeria, and Oman.

During the period covered by the index, 12 Arab countries were affected by terrorist attacks, while terrorism was unable to execute attacks in 10 other Arab countries in 2024, leaving these nations free from terrorism that year. The absence of terrorism in these countries can be attributed to various factors, including political stability, economic abundance, the lack of social grievances, as well as counter-terrorism efforts and intelligence-sharing initiatives. These countries have also tightened their grip on the financing of terrorism, with some

 $<sup>^4 \</sup>text{ ISIS branch exports small quantities of gold mined in Somalia's Puntland, } \underline{\text{https://tinyurl.com/3kah246b}}$ 




implementing the recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) aimed at combating money laundering and terrorist financing. Furthermore, some Arab countries established executive offices to combat money laundering and terrorist financing in 2024.

Table (1): Most Affected and Terror-Free Arab Countries by Terrorism

| Countries Most Affected by Terrorism | Terror-Free Countries |
|--------------------------------------|-----------------------|
| Syria                                | Egypt                 |
| Somalia                              | Kuwait                |
| Yemen                                | UAE                   |
| Iraq                                 | Saudi Arabia          |
| Sudan                                | Mauritania            |
| Libya                                | Bahrain               |
| Lebanon                              | Qatar                 |
| Jordan                               | Djibouti              |
| Tunisia                              | Comoros               |
| Morocco                              | Palestine             |
| Algeria                              |                       |
| Sultanate Of Oman                    |                       |

Syria topped the terrorism index in terms of the number of military and civilian casualties, with terrorist operations in Syria resulting in 669 deaths—554 military personnel and approximately 115 civilians. The operations also led to 235 injuries among military and civilian individuals combined. Syria accounts for 46.4% of the total casualties from terrorist operations in the Arab region.

Figure (3): Victims of Terrorist Operations in Arab Countries





The table above indicates that Sudan had the highest number of civilian casualties from terrorist attacks, with 241 deaths, representing 38.9% of the total civilian fatalities from terrorism. Somalia follows, with terrorist operations leading to the deaths of 183 civilians. The following table categorizes the fatalities and injuries in Arab countries based on whether they were military or civilian.

Table (2): Arab Countries According to Deaths and Injuries Index

| Country           | Military<br>Fatalities | Military<br>Injuries | Civilian<br>Fatalities | Civilian Injuries |
|-------------------|------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| Syria             | 554                    | 113                  | 115                    | 122               |
| Somalia           | 129                    | 60                   | 183                    | 193               |
| Yemen             | 86                     | 128                  | 40                     | 16                |
| Iraq              | 42                     | 75                   | 15                     | 31                |
| Sudan             | 5                      | 1                    | 241                    | 286               |
| Libya             | 2                      | 0                    | 16                     | 4                 |
| Lebanon           | 0                      | 3                    | 1                      | 0                 |
| Jordan            | 3                      | 50                   | 0                      | 0                 |
| Tunisia           | 0                      | 0                    | 1                      | 1                 |
| Morocco           | 0                      | 0                    | 0                      | 0                 |
| Algeria           | 0                      | 0                    | 1                      | 0                 |
| Sultanate of Oman | 0                      | 0                    | 6                      | 50                |

The table also shows that the three terrorist operations carried out in Lebanon did not result in significant human losses, which may indicate poor planning for these attacks. In some countries, such as Morocco, where an operation by the Polisario Front took place, there were no recorded human casualties. Conversely, the only terrorist operation in Oman targeted civilians, resulting in the deaths of six individuals and injuries to 50 others.



# **Spatial Distribution of Terrorism in the Arab Region**

- Terrorism continues to enhance its geographical presence in certain areas compared to
  others within the Arab region. The countries classified in the Levant came at the
  forefront, significantly affected by terrorism in 2024, witnessing approximately 278
  terrorist operations, which account for more than half of the total terrorist operations
  in the Arab region for that year. This represents 65.2% of the total terrorist incidents.
  This increase can be attributed to the terrorist operations conducted in Syrian territory,
  which reached 222 incidents.
- 2. Following the Levant, the Horn of Africa recorded 78 terrorist operations, constituting 18.3% of the total incidents, with more than half of these occurring in Somalia. These activities were carried out by Al-Shabaab and the ISIS affiliate in Somalia, which appears to be preparing to challenge Al-Shabaab over the long term. Meanwhile, the remaining attacks occurred in Sudan, which continues to be affected by the armed conflict between the armed forces and the Rapid Support Forces.




Figure (4): Spatial Distribution of Terrorist Operations in the Arab Region

3. The above illustration shows that except for the terrorist operations that took place in Yemen and Oman, the rest of the Gulf region was free from any terrorist incidents in 2024. Countries such as the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain have strengthened their information exchange concerning terrorism and accelerated their counterterrorism efforts. This is evident in the arrest of a terrorist cell by security forces in Kuwait, who were planning to target a Shia mosque, mirroring what occurred in Oman. Nevertheless, the terrorist incident in Oman and the thwarted planned attack in Kuwait in January 2024 confirm that the threat of terrorism is not distant from the Gulf states.



4. The Maghreb region and North Africa recorded the least incidents, with around 16 terrorist operations, accounting for 3.7% of the total operations. This can be attributed to efforts that have managed to curb terrorism in Egypt and Morocco, along with the coordination and information exchange between Tunisia and Algeria, which has led to the retreat of remaining jihadist individuals into mountainous areas in both countries. Generally, Maghreb countries need to tighten border controls to mitigate the risks of terrorism and limit its dangers.

# **Most Active Terrorist Groups in the Arab Region**

In 2024, ISIS was the most active group in carrying out terrorist operations. Analyzing the operations documented in the organization's weekly publication, "Al-Naba," and through independent documentation by Maat, ISIS claimed responsibility for 150 terrorist operations distributed across four Arab countries: Syria, Iraq, Somalia, and Oman, as illustrated in the figure below.




Figure (5): ISIS Terrorist Operations Distributed by Arab Countries

As highlighted above, ISIS's activities in the Syrian Arab Republic were the most significant compared to other Arab countries, with its operations accounting for 74.6% of the total operations in the Arab region. To a lesser extent, the organization also claimed several terrorist attacks in Iraq, which represented 22% of its total operations in 2024. Most of the attacks took place in rural and remote areas, particularly in the provinces of Deir ez-Zor, Homs, and Raqqa.





Image of an ISIS propaganda poster featuring Abu Hafs al-Qurashi

| ISIS                   |   |
|------------------------|---|
| Number of Operations   | • 150                                     |
| Number of Individuals  | • 3000                                    |
| Financial Resources    | • \$10 million                            |
| Leader of Organization | Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Qurashi            |
|                        | • Donations                               |
| Sources of Revenue     | <ul> <li>Kidnapping and Ransom</li> </ul> |
|                        | Livestock Theft                           |

Next in line was Al-Shabaab in Somalia, which claimed responsibility for 46 terrorist operations, all within Somalia's borders. The group primarily targeted government forces and the African Union mission in Somalia. Although terrorist operations have declined slightly in 2024, the group has maintained financial resources that enhance its capability to conduct attacks, utilizing both legitimate and illegitimate means to generate sufficient revenue for its operations, including through checkpoints, extortion against businesses, and coercive taxation.

Al-Shabaab remains a fundamental threat to stability in Somalia, retaining the capacity to plan and execute terrorist operations even in the Somali capital, Mogadishu. However, it has



occasionally faced setbacks due to competition with the ISIS affiliate<sup>6</sup> in Somalia and preemptive strikes by security forces as part of the military campaign announced by the government. In 2024, the group lost some territory it had controlled over the past five years.



Image of Armed Fighters from Al-Shabaab


| Al-Shabaab in Somalia     |   |
|---------------------------|---|
| Number of Operations      | • 46  |
| Number of Individuals     | • 10,000  |
| Financial Resources       | • \$150 million                                       |
| Leader of Organization    | Ahmed Diriye (Abu Ubaidah)                            |
|                           | Checkpoints   |
| <b>Sources of Revenue</b> | <ul> <li>Extortion of Commercial Companies</li> </ul> |
|                           | Forced Taxation                                       |

Following that, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which took control of governance on December 8, 2024, as part of a coalition of armed groups, executed 39 terrorist operations during the reporting period. The figure below illustrates the groups that carried out terrorist attacks in Arab countries in 2024.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> Mapping al-Shabaab's activity in Somalia in 2024", https://acleddata.com/2024/12/13/mapping-al-shabaabs-activity-in-somalia-in-2024/



Figure (6): Attacks by Terrorist Groups in Arab Countries



# A total of 124 terrorist operations were attributed to unidentified perpetrators in 2024

The figure also indicates that Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, specifically in Yemen, ranked as the fourth group to have conducted terrorist operations, with approximately 30 incidents, all occurring in Yemen, particularly in southern Yemen, especially in Abyan and Shabwa governorates.

| Al-Qaeda               |  |
|------------------------|--|
| Number of Operations   | • 30                                   |
| Number of Individuals  | • 2,000–3,000                          |
| Financial Resources    | • \$150 million                        |
| Leader of Organization | Saad al-Awlaki                         |
| Sources of Revenue     | Looting and Theft                      |
|                        | External Funding                       |
|                        | Soliciting Donations and Oil Smuggling |

In 2024, Al-Qaeda claimed responsibility for 30 terrorist operations in the Arab region, all of which occurred in Yemen. The organization maintained the same level of operations as in 18



previous years. The alliance Al-Qaeda has formed with some local tribes is crucial for the continuation of its activities and the potential for its expansion.

The data indicates a significant variation in operations among different organizations in the region, with some groups consistently outperforming others. Other organizations that claimed responsibility for terrorist operations include the Janjaweed in Sudan, which conducted 23 terrorist operations primarily targeting civilians, resulting in a higher number of civilian casualties. The Houthi movement in Yemen, along with other groups such as "Soldiers of the Caliphate," "Islamic Resistance in Iraq," and the Polisario fighters, also executed a limited number of attacks, as did Ahrar al-Sham in Syria.

# **Terrorism in Arab Countries: Analytical View**

In 2024, terrorism affected 12 Arab countries, while 10 others remained free from such violence. The ability to confront terrorist attacks is linked to political stability, the lack of widening battlefronts in areas of armed conflict, and the capability to reduce the illicit flow of weapons to prevent them from reaching terrorist groups. Despite counter-terrorism efforts in Iraq and security operations in Somalia, terrorist groups in both countries continue to evade security forces and execute coordinated attacks that pose significant challenges to the security apparatus in certain states. Notably, ISIS activity has been resurgent in Syria, particularly in the Syrian desert, where ISIS members have taken refuge and have mainly targeted National Defense Forces and military personnel belonging to the Syrian armed forces. There is still concern about the evolution of terrorist groups' methods in carrying out operations, particularly their use of emerging technologies such as drones to achieve their objectives in execution and reconnaissance. This is exemplified by the case of Al-Qaeda in Yemen, which appears to have entered into a mutually beneficial alliance with the Houthi movement.





استهداف ضابط عراقي في عملية إرهابية



استهداف داعش للجيش العراقي في كركوك



تنظيم داعش يعلن عملية إرهابية في الوادي الكبير بملطنة عمان



هجوم على حقل نفطي في حمص من قبل تنظيم داعش

Compilation by Maat of Selected Terrorist Operations



# 1. Syria



| Civilian Injuries | Civilian<br>Fatalities | Military Injuries | Military<br>Fatalities | Number of<br>Operations |
|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| 122               | 115                    | 113               | 554                    | 222                     |

Syria is the most affected Arab country by terrorist operations, with 222 attacks carried out on its territory in 2024. The majority of these attacks took place in Deir ez-Zor province and the Badia region, where more than 500 ISIS members are hiding. Additionally, Syrian military personnel have suffered the highest number of casualties due to terrorism in the Arab region, with 554 Syrian soldiers killed. This figure represents 67% of the total military fatalities in all Arab countries impacted by terrorism.


The increase in terrorism in Syria in 2024 can be attributed to ISIS's resilience and its ability to plan terrorist operations. The organization claimed responsibility for 103 terrorist operations in Syria, which accounts for 73% of the total operations attributed to ISIS across three Arab countries. Despite the airstrikes from the international coalition that resulted in the deaths of over 100 ISIS members in Syria, this has not discouraged the remaining members. ISIS's attacks in Syria were not limited to government forces; they also targeted the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in northeastern Syria, with many attacks focusing on fuel trucks in Deir ez-Zor province to extort money from oil traders. Furthermore, the group has employed more



sophisticated methods for its attacks, including the use of vehicles and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) carried by individuals.<sup>7</sup>

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, classified as a terrorist group under UN Security Council Resolution 2254, continued to execute terrorist operations, with 39 incidents attributed to the organization in 2024. Even after assuming control in Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has maintained connections with several foreign fighters in the country, suggesting that some members have not shed their extremist ideologies despite the group's ascension to power.<sup>8</sup>

### 2. Somalia



| Civilian Injuries | Civilian<br>Fatalities | Military Injuries | Military<br>Fatalities | Number of<br>Operations |
|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| 193               | 183                    | 60                | 129                    | 54                      |

Somalia emerged as the third Arab country most affected by terrorism in the region in 2024. Throughout the reporting period, Al-Shabaab remained as active as it had been in previous years. However, a notable development in 2024 was the announcement by ISIS's affiliate in Somalia, which intensified its presence in the Bari region of Puntland, taking refuge in the Cal Miskaad Mountains.

The Cal Miskaad Mountain range is a remote area with a sparse population, where the Puntland government maintains control over nearby population centers and major roads. Both Al-Shabaab and ISIS in Somalia have managed to infiltrate the mountainous regions without establishing control over infrastructure or local populations.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup> https://docs.un.org/en/S/2025/71/Rev.1

<sup>8</sup> How Hayat Tahrir al-Sham Landed on U.S. Terrorist Lists—and Why It Should Stay There for Now, https://tinyurl.com/2bfp6t2r



Estimates suggest that ISIS's emergence in Somalia is supported by its ability to secure resources, coordinated with the Karar Office in Somalia, which serves as a financial hub linking branches in Afghanistan, Africa, and Yemen to ISIS's "central command" in Iraq and Syria. <sup>9</sup> The presence of ISIS in Somalia is concentrated in the Bari region of Puntland, where extortion and smuggling rates are high, along with the influx of foreign fighters, posing new security risks for Somalia and the Horn of Africa.

Overall, the situation underscores the complexities and evolving nature of terrorism in Syria and Somalia, highlighting the persistent threats these regions face from both established and emerging terrorist groups. <sup>10</sup> Al-Shabaab, the group affiliated with Al-Qaeda, has continued to exhibit advanced offensive capabilities. The group has maintained its ability to access the capital, Mogadishu. In response to a government decision mandating businesses to install surveillance cameras in the city, Al-Shabaab escalated its operations. Most of these attacks targeted business centers that had installed the cameras, as well as their owners, leading to a state of fear within the business community. <sup>11</sup>

According to information, half of ISIS's human structure in Somalia consists of foreign terrorist fighters from various countries. Recruitment campaigns have targeted neighboring countries, North African nations, and Yemen. Reports from member states indicate that ISIS in Somalia has refocused its efforts on securing financial sustainability, and allocating revenues to enhance its operational capabilities. Reports also suggest that the operational capacities of ISIS in Somalia have developed significantly.



<sup>9</sup> Letter dated 19 July 2024 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/556

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Situation in Somalia Report of the Secretary-General, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/698

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> Al-Shabaab targets civilians in Somalia in retaliation for installing CCTV cameras, <a href="https://tinyurl.com/4w2jz2ma">https://tinyurl.com/4w2jz2ma</a>



The activity of ISIS in Somalia is estimated to have begun in 2015 when a group of Al-Shabaab fighters defected and pledged allegiance to ISIS. The operations of this group have primarily been centered in Puntland, Somalia.<sup>12</sup>

The organization has exploited the proximity of Puntland to the Arabian Gulf and the Red Sea to transport and train members while acquiring smuggled weapons or transferring arms to other groups. Puntland accounts for 33% of Somalia's coastline and is only 130 nautical miles from Yemen.

The number of fighters in the organization in Somalia has increased from approximately 500 in 2019<sup>13</sup> to between 700 and 1,000 fighters by the end of 2024. It appears that ISIS has specifically chosen Bari as a connection point between the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Gulf via the Red Sea, facilitating the movement and training of its fighters and the smuggling of weapons.

Terrorist groups in Somalia have been able to bolster their resources. For instance, Al-Shabaab reportedly generates approximately \$100 million in annual revenues. The group engages in systematic extortion targeting businesses and individuals in Somalia, leveraging its regional control to maintain a steady flow of income. Its tactics include establishing checkpoints to extort vehicles and goods transported along supply routes and imposing illegal taxes on residential properties and new construction projects in Mogadishu.

### 3. Yemen



| Civilian Injuries | Civilian<br>Fatalities | Military Injuries | Military<br>Fatalities | Number of<br>Operations |
|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| 16                | 40                     | 128               | 86                     | 53                      |

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> Civil Society Perspectives: ISIL in Africa – Key Trends and Developments

<sup>13</sup> Letter dated 1 November 2019 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolution 751 (1992), Para 56, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2019/858



In Yemen, terrorist groups maintained a moderate level of operations throughout 2024 compared to the previous three years, with 53 terrorist incidents attributed to them, resulting in 270 casualties among military and civilian populations. Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) continued to carry out attacks primarily targeting the Southern Transitional Council forces in the Abyan and Shabwa provinces in southern Yemen, with more than half of its operations occurring in these two areas. The group employed strategies such as using improvised explosive devices (IEDs) for attacks and, in some cases, utilizing weaponized drones. Despite significant losses in its leadership, including the death of the organization's leader in Yemen, Khalid Batrafi, on March 10, 2024—reportedly due to illness—AQAP quickly announced a new leader, <sup>14</sup> Saad al-Awlaki, in March 2024. <sup>15</sup>

Civilians also became targets for AQAP; on December 27, 2024, the Al-Malahim Media Foundation, the official propaganda wing of Ansar al-Sharia in Yemen, announced the execution of 11 Yemeni citizens. Among those executed was prominent journalist Mohamed al-Muqri, who had been kidnapped in October 2015 from Mukalla, Hadhramaut, during AQAP's control of the city.

In contrast, ISIS in Yemen did not demonstrate the capability to carry out impactful operations during 2024, with an estimated fighter count ranging between 100 and 150. Reports indicated that the group held small meetings to reorganize and attempted to establish camps in Hadhramaut, Al-Mahrah, and Shabwa. However, it remained hindered by a lack of effective local leadership and internal conflicts affecting its activity.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> Letter dated 19 July 2024 from the Chair of the Security Council, Para 58, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/556

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> Letter dated 19 July 2024 from the Chair of the Security Council, para 60, https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/556



# 4. Iraq



| Civilian Injuries | Civilian<br>Fatalities | Military Injuries | Military<br>Fatalities | Number of<br>Operations |
|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| 31                | 15                     | 75                | 42                     | 51                      |

In Iraq, the pace of terrorist operations decreased in 2024 compared to the four preceding years, primarily due to effective counter-terrorism efforts and preemptive strikes by the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service against ISIS militants. The year 2024 recorded the lowest number of civilian casualties from terrorism in Iraq, with 15 civilians killed and 31 others injured. This reduction in violence is attributed to the Counter-Terrorism Service's operations throughout the year, which conducted approximately 341 security operations, resulting in the deaths and arrests of 147 ISIS members. Among those killed were 63 individuals from the leadership ranks, including the "Wali of Iraq" and the "Wali of Anbar." <sup>16</sup>



### 5. Sudan



| Number of<br>Operations | Military<br>Fatalities | Military Injuries | Civilian<br>Fatalities | Civilian Injuries |
|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| 24                      | 5                      | 1                 | 241                    | 286               |

The armed conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces has provided an opportunity for terrorism to reposition itself in Sudan, which represents a convergence point of the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and North Africa. Consequently, the prolonged duration of the conflict may lead to the formation of an ideal environment for terrorist networks and organized crime, potentially complicating matters in the near future. ISIS has focused its propaganda efforts in Sudan on inciting jihad, raising funds, and conducting operations against both parties to the conflict, urging its followers to exploit the opportunity<sup>17</sup> to establish a branch of the organization in Sudan<sup>18</sup> that embarks on a long jihadist path. There has been a noticeable increase in civilian casualties as a result of terrorist operations in Sudan, and the high ratio of civilian deaths and injuries compared to military ones indicates targeting of populated areas or the use of weapons with widespread effects.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> Sudan's descent into chaos sets stage for al-Qaida to make a return to historic stronghold, <a href="https://theconversation.com/sudans-descent-into-chaos-sets-stage-for-al-qaida-to-make-a-return-to-historic-stronghold-228954">https://theconversation.com/sudans-descent-into-chaos-sets-stage-for-al-qaida-to-make-a-return-to-historic-stronghold-228954</a>

<sup>18</sup> Islamic State (ISIS) Weekly Editorial Warns Muslims In Sudan To Mistrust Warring Parties, Urges 'Supporters Of Mujahideen' To Form 'A Nucleus Of Jihad,' Strive To Recruit And Prepare For 'Long-Lasting Jihad', <a href="https://www.memri.org/jttm/islamic-state-isis-weekly-editorial-warns-muslims-sudan-mistrust-warring-parties-urges">https://www.memri.org/jttm/islamic-state-isis-weekly-editorial-warns-muslims-sudan-mistrust-warring-parties-urges</a>







| Number of<br>Operations | Military<br>Fatalities | Military Injuries | Civilian<br>Fatalities | Civilian Injuries |
|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| 13                      | 2                      | 0                 | 16                     | 4                 |

Terrorist groups carried out 13 attacks in Libya during 2024, resulting in approximately 22 casualties among military and civilian populations. Most of these operations were attributed to unidentified assailants, and ISIS did not conduct any widely impactful operations. The organization is estimated to consist of between 100 and 200 fighters spread across small, scattered cells in the Fezzan region of southern Libya; however, other estimates suggest that the number of militants in Libya could reach up to 400, active along the Chad-Niger route.<sup>19</sup>

During the reporting period, ISIS in Libya played a role in arms trafficking and acted as a transit point for transporting militants to Islamic State-affiliated groups in the Sahel region. Additionally, ISIS Libya engaged in criminal activities, including drug and fuel smuggling and exploiting gold mines. Recruitment efforts were directed towards citizens of neighboring countries, primarily through encrypted communication platforms. In October 2024, Libyan security forces apprehended Syrian nationals who had transferred funds to ISIS in the Syrian Arab Republic to facilitate the movement of militants from Syria to Mali via Libya.

Al-Qaeda has been active in southwestern Libya, benefiting from tribal connections to maintain logistical and financial support, particularly for groups affiliated with it in the Sahel region. In July 2024, a cell led by a Libyan individual linked to the Jamaa al-Nusra wa al-Islam

<sup>19</sup> Ibid



was dismantled; this cell was responsible for supplying satellite communication devices. During the reporting period, Al-Qaeda-affiliated groups attempted to integrate into local tribes, which was understood as a precursor to establishing a presence.

In parallel with the collapse of Bashar al-Assad's regime in Syria, on December 21, 2024, internal security in Benghazi thwarted a terrorist cell linked to Syrian factions that was reportedly prepared to execute operations threatening Libya's stability. Upon apprehending the cell members, authorities found detailed maps of several strategic sites in Libya, as well as modern communication devices used to coordinate with their leaders. The primary mission of this cell was to collect intelligence and monitor movements within Benghazi, in addition to attempts to recruit new Syrian elements for carrying out terrorist attacks. Simultaneously, national counter-terrorism operations significantly reduced the activities of ISIS and Al-Qaeda. In January 2024, Hashim Abdeljawad Abu Sidra, the leader of ISIS in Libya, was arrested by security forces, and according to credible reports, the ISIS leader provided the security forces with information that helped eliminate several terrorist cells in Libya, thereby limiting the organization's capabilities in the country.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> https://docs.un.org/en/S/2024/556



# 7. Lebanon



| Number of<br>Operations | Military<br>Fatalities | Military Injuries | Civilian<br>Fatalities | Civilian Injuries |
|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| 3                       | 0                      | 3                 | 1                      | 0                 |

Lebanon was the target of three terrorist operations in 2024; however, these operations did not have a wide-ranging impact as they did not result in significant human losses. The three attacks were attributed to unidentified assailants, as shown in the table below:

| Details of Operation  | Perpetrator | Date of<br>Incident | Victims                   |
|---|-------------|---------------------|---------------------------|
| Armed individual opened fire on<br>Lebanese army personnel at Rifah<br>checkpoint in Tripoli, northern<br>Lebanon.    | Unknown     | March 7             | No victims                |
| Shooting attack targeted a Lebanese citizen in his home in Bayt Meri, near Lebanese capital, Beirut.                  | Unknown     | April 10            | One civilian killed       |
| Explosion occurred near a military vehicle marked with United Nations insignia in vicinity of Yarin, southern Lebanon | Unknown     | August 18           | Three soldiers<br>injured |



# 8. Jordan




| Number of<br>Operations | Military<br>Fatalities | Military Injuries | Civilian<br>Fatalities | Civilian Injuries |
|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| 2                       | 3                      | 50                | 0                      | 0                 |

Jordan was the target of two terrorist attacks in 2024, which resulted in the deaths of 3 military personnel and injuries to 50 others. This development may be attributed to regional circumstances, including the war in Gaza, as one of the terrorist attacks was executed from outside Jordan's borders and was claimed by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq on January 28, 2024.



### 9. Sultanate of Oman



| Number of<br>Operations | Military<br>Fatalities | Military Injuries | Civilian<br>Fatalities | Civilian Injuries |
|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| 1                       | 0                      | 0                 | 6                      | 50                |

ISIS executed its first operation in Oman since the formation of the organization. This attack took place in Imam Ali Mosque in the Wadi Kabir area on July 15, 2024, resulting in more than 55 casualties. According to information, the organization had planned to carry out attacks in Oman since 2017, especially attacks targeting countries participating in the global coalition to defeat ISIS. Although these plans have never materialized, they indicate that the Islamic State has been interested in directly attacking the country for seven years, if not longer.



# 10. Kingdom of Morocco



| Number of<br>Operations | Military<br>Fatalities | Military Injuries | Civilian<br>Fatalities | Civilian Injuries |
|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| 1                       | 0                      | 0                 | 0                      | 0                 |

Terrorist operations in Morocco declined during 2024, with only one recorded incident attributed to armed individuals linked to the Polisario Front on May 18, 2024, in the city of Smara. Preemptive strikes by security forces prevented planned attacks in urban Moroccan cities. In 2024, Moroccan security forces arrested 24 individuals alleged to belong to terrorist groups and dismantled five terrorist cells. Additionally, Moroccan efforts to contain terrorism resulted in the dismantling of a sleeping cell loyal to ISIS, consisting of 4 individuals located in the cities of "Tiznit" and "Sidi Slimane." They were found in possession of semi-military equipment, including a vest and helmet, along with extremist literature. In the same context, the Moroccan government continued in 2024 to seek the exchange of expertise related to counter-terrorism and, during the reporting period, entered into a strategic partnership with the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism.



# 11. Algeria



| Number of Operations | Military Fatalities | Military Injuries | Civilian<br>Fatalities | Civilian Injuries |
|----------------------|---------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| 1                    | 0                   | 0                 | 1                      | 0                 |

Like other Maghreb countries, terrorism has not managed to carry out widespread attacks in Algeria, except for a terrorist attack targeting a Swiss tourist in the town of Jend, southeast Algeria, which took place on October 11, 2024. No terrorist group claimed responsibility for this incident. The Algerian borders continue to present an opportunity for terrorists to infiltrate the country. According to the Algerian Ministry of Defense on May 16, 2024, nine individuals suspected of belonging to ISIS were arrested;<sup>21</sup> they had entered the country through the shared border with Mali, carrying weapons and plans to execute terrorist operations within Algeria.<sup>22</sup>



### 12. Tunisia



| Number of Operations | Military<br>Fatalities | Military Injuries | Civilian<br>Fatalities | Civilian Injuries |
|----------------------|------------------------|-------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| 1                    | 0                      | 0                 | 1                      | 1                 |

Terrorist groups carried out one terrorist operation in 2024, which was claimed by the Khalifa Brigade, resulting in the death and injury of a civilian. The noticeable decline in terrorist activity in Tunisia is attributed to counter-terrorism efforts and the containment of the Khalifa Brigade and the Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade in mountainous areas. For instance, in April 2024, Tunisian authorities arrested several members belonging to the Khalifa Brigade, loyal to ISIS, including the Emir of the Khalifa Brigade, Mahmoud Al-Salami, who was found in possession of several weapons and explosive belts.



## **Weapons Used in Terrorism**

Among the 426 terrorist operations that occurred in the Arab region, Maat documented the use of specific weapons in 142 of these attacks, indicating that the capabilities to assess the weapons used are available for 33.3% of the total terrorist operations. The weapons varied between explosive devices, hand grenades, and drones, as illustrated in the table below.

Table (3): Frequency of Specific Weapons Used in Terrorist Attacks

| Weapoi                            | n   | Frequency of Use |
|-----------------------------------|---|------------------|
| Improvised Explosive Device (IED) | ****                                      | 54               |
| Hand Grenade                      |   | 11               |
| Light and Medium<br>Weapons       | TI AND M                                  | 47               |
| Car Bomb                          |   | 22               |
| Drones                            | A. C. | 8                |

From the previous table, it can be observed that terrorist groups heavily rely on explosive devices, which is linked to the ease of manufacturing these devices. Light and medium weapons follow next, followed by car bombs. Terrorist groups have also used explosive belts in carrying out certain terrorist operations, such as those that occurred in Syria, Somalia, and Iraq.

In Yemen, Al-Qaeda and the Houthis have relied on drones for some operations, and Al-Qaeda is generally trying to enhance its reliance on these drones for attack and surveillance purposes. In Iraq, ISIS has depended on indirect fire methods in its operations, using small and medium automatic weapons, and in some operations, the organization executed its attacks with homemade bombs.



# **Developments Related to Terrorism in 2024**

By tracking the terrorist operations conducted by terrorist groups in 2024, Maat has noted several emerging trends and developments that may grow in the future. Perhaps the most significant of these developments is the increased reliance on unmanned aerial vehicles (drones), in addition to the continued dependence on foreign militants and the ability of terrorist groups to adapt technology to their advantage.

### 1. Unmanned Aerial Vehicles



Due to the cooperation between terrorist groups and armed factions that de facto control parts of territories in Arab regions, drones have reached terrorists, particularly Al-Qaeda in Yemen, which carried out about 30 terrorist operations in Yemen in 2024, some of which involved the use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

The arrival of this technology to terrorist groups poses a challenge to Arab national security and represents a direct threat to it. The use of these drones by the Houthi movement in Yemen for offensive purposes has been evident in the past, while ISIS in Syria and Iraq, and Al-Shabaab in Somalia have used these drones for reconnaissance and information gathering, and occasionally for carrying explosives. <sup>23</sup> The acquisition of more drones by these groups may threaten national states and cause significant casualties among civilians, as well as damage to civilian infrastructure and economic facilities. According to information from Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, there is a general trend towards increasing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> How to Keep the Islamic State Down in 2022 and Beyond, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, January 2022, <a href="https://bit.ly/3Nibb45">https://bit.ly/3Nibb45</a>



reliance on drones, including commercial drones that the group has used for surveillance operations.

Similarly, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has relied on "Shaheen Brigades" to manufacture and deploy drones with advanced capabilities. According to other information, a military brigade affiliated with the group, consisting of 300 to 350 individuals, has modified commercial drones to become weapons capable of delivering explosives to targeted areas, in addition to developing advanced drones equipped with screens and surveillance cameras.

## 2. Foreign Militants

The reliance of terrorist groups on foreign militants continues to flow. Maat noted that when ISIS attacked the Puntland security forces in Somalia on December 31, resulting in the deaths of 22 security personnel, militants from seven different nationalities participated in the attacks, according to a statement from the organization itself.



ISIS Somalia Militants Who Attacked Security Forces in Puntland

Individuals with alleged connections to ISIS or their families are still being held. In the al-Hol and Roj camps, as well as in detention facilities and other centers, including rehabilitation centers, it is estimated that 8,600 foreigners remain in these camps. ISIS has attempted to release some of them either through security tricks or by paying money for their release.



# 3. New Technologies for Gaining Sympathy and Donations

Terrorists have rapidly adopted technological advancements in 2024, raising concerns about the growing recruitment through the internet, primarily targeting minors and young people via alternative internet platforms, the dark web, and encrypted chat applications. It is noted that terrorists can create distorted narratives based on the misinterpretation and distortion of religion to justify violence. These narratives are exploited to recruit more individuals and mobilize resources, garnering support from sympathizers, particularly through the use of the internet and other information and communication technologies, including social media platforms.

The attempt by terrorist groups to exploit the internet for their benefit has not been limited to recruiting more individuals. Maat observed that Al-Shabaab in Somalia has conducted repeated experiments with 3D printing to manufacture components for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The success of these experiments could lead to the production of components for offensive devices, such as homemade explosives or unmanned aerial systems equipped with weapons, potentially allowing them to circumvent restrictions on arms imposed under the sanctions against ISIS and Al-Qaeda. According to research, members of the organization have used the internet to launch online fundraising campaigns via messaging and social media platforms, including Telegram, WhatsApp, and Facebook, to support the families of ISIS militants who were transferred to camps following the organization's defeat in northeastern Syria. Fundraisers announce on their electronic channels, groups, and accounts that the funds are sent to the camps to improve the conditions of the detainees or to secure their release. 25

## 4. Dependence on Artificial Intelligence

Some reports suggest that terrorist groups will try to maximize their use of artificial intelligence and experiment with it. The use of AI by terrorist groups may pose a particular risk in recruiting youth and pushing them towards extremism, including through more targeted and precisely designed propaganda. Several member states have also noted that the average age of extremists appears to be decreasing.

 $<sup>^{24} \,</sup> Letter \, dated \, 19 \, July \, 2024 \, from \, the \, Chair \, of \, the \, Security \, Council, \\ \frac{https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/191/91/pdf/n2419191.pdf}{https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n24/191/91/pdf/n2419191.pdf}$ 

<sup>25</sup> CTED Trends Tracker Evolving Trends in the Financing of Foreign Terrorist Fighters' Activity: 2014 – 2024, PAGE 13, https://tinyurl.com/2fx78xau



Terrorist groups operating in Arab countries will attempt to adapt to geopolitical changes in the region and exploit current conditions to their advantage, recruiting more individuals to join them. Terrorist organizations will likely try to change their strategies in four Arab countries:

### 1. Syria

The alarming rise in terrorist operations in 2024 is likely to continue into 2025, particularly in central Syria and the Deir ez-Zor and Homs regions, where the organization remains capable of hiding and maintaining a presence in some desert areas. If ISIS's attempts to smuggle its members out of prisons succeed, this could lead to broader control over parts of the territory.

### 2. Somalia

The pace of terrorist operations in Somalia is not expected to decrease in 2025. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and foreign forces in the country will remain targets for Al-Shabaab's terrorist operations. The conclusions of the final statement from the meeting held by the Islamic State administrations with Al-Shabaab leaders clearly indicate this.<sup>26</sup>

### 3. Iraq

The continued presence of the international coalition forces and the experience gained by Iraqi security forces, along with ISIS's loss of most of its senior leadership in Iraq, such as the governors of Iraq and Anbar, will limit terrorist operations during 2025. However, these positive indicators remain primarily linked to the establishment of a stable political environment in Iraq.

### 4. Yemen

Planning for terrorist attacks in southern Yemen will not cease, particularly given the propaganda escalation by Al-Qaeda regarding the forces stationed in the south and their allies. Reducing the intensity of these attacks will be linked to pre-emptive strikes, successful intelligence operations, and the ability to neutralize a significant number of the organization's senior leaders. Additionally, disrupting the emerging alliance based on interests between the Houthi movement and Al-Qaeda will be crucial.

<sup>26</sup> البيان الختامي للاجتماع الذي عقدته إدارات الولايات الإسلامية مع قيادة حركة الشباب المجاهدين، على الرابط التالي https://tinyurl.com/msfzwyej:



### **Conclusions & Recommendations**

Terrorism remains a serious challenge that threatens human rights and regional security in the Arab region, especially in countries suffering from prolonged armed conflicts and deep political divisions. The ongoing instability weakens state institutions, exacerbates humanitarian situations, and creates a fertile environment for the growth of terrorist groups.

Despite the relative decline of ISIS in Iraq, the organization has re-adapted its strategy to expand its activities in Syria and Somalia, exploiting security gaps and political challenges. The terrorist attacks in the Sultanate of Oman in 2024 set a dangerous precedent, demonstrating the ability of terrorist organizations to expand into new areas that were previously outside their operational scope.

Mitigating the risks of terrorism in the Arab region depends on strengthening regional and international cooperation, intensifying efforts to combat the financing of terrorism, curbing the flow of arms to armed groups, and activating law enforcement mechanisms in accordance with international standards.



# **Recommendations by Maat**

- Emphasize the commitment of states to fully support victims of terrorism, including psychological and social rehabilitation, legal compensation, and ensuring their access to justice in accordance with international human rights standards.
- Maat calls on the Arab League to prepare a comprehensive study focusing on analyzing the political, economic, and social factors that lead to the spread of terrorism, proposing prevention strategies based on sustainable development policies, strengthening the rule of law, and empowering local communities.
- Urge Arab countries to intensify efforts to monitor arms flows and increase funding for programs aimed at reducing the proliferation of illicit weapons, in accordance with international frameworks such as the United Nations Program against the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons.
- Maat calls on Arab countries to strengthen their partnerships with international bodies, such as the United Nations Office of Counter-Terrorism (UNOCT) and the Executive Directorate of the Counter-Terrorism Committee of the Security Council (CTED), to benefit from modern expertise and technologies in combating terrorism.
- It is necessary to fund research, studies, and investigative journalism that analyze the developments of terrorism in the Arab region, ensuring that their findings are integrated into counter-terrorism policies, aiming to develop an evidence-based approach using reliable information.
- Establish specialized units to combat the financing of terrorism and money laundering in all Arab countries that have not yet adopted advanced regulatory mechanisms, in line with the international standards set by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF).
- Maat asserts that combating terrorism must be comprehensive and sustainable, extending beyond security solutions to enhance the rule of law, respect human rights, and activate mechanisms of justice and accountability to ensure the establishment of a safe and stable environment in the Arab region.



# Appendix I: Terrorist Operations in 2024 by Country

| Country           | Number of Terrorist Operations |
|-------------------|--------------------------------|
| Syria             | 222                            |
| Somalia           | 54                             |
| Yemen             | 53                             |
| Iraq              | 51                             |
| Sudan             | 24                             |
| Libya             | 13                             |
| Lebanon           | 3                              |
| Jordan            | 2                              |
| Tunisia           | 1                              |
| Morocco           | 1                              |
| Sultanate of Oman | 1                              |
| Algeria           | 1                              |
| Egypt             | 0                              |
| Bahrain           | 0                              |
| UAE               | 0                              |
| Saudi Arabia      | 0                              |
| Kuwait            | 0                              |
| Mauritania        | 0                              |
| Comoros           | 0                              |
| Djibouti          | 0                              |
| Qatar             | 0                              |
| Palestine         | 0                              |



Appendix II: Fatalities and Injuries per Country in the Arab Region (2024)

| Country           | Military<br>Fatalities | Military<br>Injuries | Civilian<br>Fatalities | Civilian Injuries |
|-------------------|------------------------|----------------------|------------------------|-------------------|
| Syria             | 554                    | 113                  | 115                    | 122               |
| Somalia           | 129                    | 60                   | 183                    | 193               |
| Yemen             | 86                     | 128                  | 40                     | 16                |
| Iraq              | 42                     | 75                   | 15                     | 31                |
| Sudan             | 5                      | 1                    | 241                    | 286               |
| Libya             | 2                      | 0                    | 16                     | 4                 |
| Lebanon           | 0                      | 3                    | 1                      | 0                 |
| Jordan            | 3                      | 50                   | 0                      | 0                 |
| Tunisia           | 0                      | 0                    | 1                      | 1                 |
| Morocco           | 0                      | 0                    | 0                      | 0                 |
| Sultanate of Oman | 0                      | 0                    | 6                      | 50                |
| Algeria           | 0                      | 0                    | 1                      | 0                 |
| Egypt             | 0                      | 0                    | 0                      | 0                 |
| Bahrain           | 0                      | 0                    | 0                      | 0                 |
| UAE               | 0                      | 0                    | 0                      | 0                 |
| Saudi Arabia      | 0                      | 0                    | 0                      | 0                 |
| Kuwait            | 0                      | 0                    | 0                      | 0                 |
| Mauritania        | 0                      | 0                    | 0                      | 0                 |
| Comoros           | 0                      | 0                    | 0                      | 0                 |
| Djibouti          | 0                      | 0                    | 0                      | 0                 |
| Qatar             | 0                      | 0                    | 0                      | 0                 |
| Palestine         | 0                      | 0                    | 0                      | 0                 |



# Appendix III: Terrorist Groups in the Arab Region in 2024

| Terrorist Group            | Number of Operations Attributed |
|----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| ISIS (Daesh)               | 150                             |
| Al-Shabaab                 | 46                              |
| Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham      | 39                              |
| Al-Qaeda                   | 30                              |
| Janjaweed (Sudan)          | 23                              |
| Houthi Movement            | 10                              |
| Jund al-Khilafah           | 1                               |
| Islamic Resistance in Iraq | 1                               |
| Polisario Armed Fighters   | 1                               |
| Ahrar al-Sham              | 1                               |
| Unknown                    | 124                             |